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Origins of IV&V within NASA
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• NASA's IV&V Program: established in 1993 
• Founded under the NASA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (OSMA) as a direct result of recommendations 
made by the National Research Council (NRC) and 
the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space 
Shuttle Challenger Accident.
The Need for IV&V
Developing complex, safety and mission-critical software systems 
is inherently challenging, and that creates risk.
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Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) is an objective 
examination of safety and mission 
critical software processes and products 
Systems Engineering:  Determines if 
the right system has been built and 
that it has been built correctly
NASA IV&V perspectives: 
• Will the system’s software…
• Do what it is supposed to do?
• Not do what it is not supposed to do?
• Respond as expected under adverse 
conditions?
Independence:  3 key parameters:
• Technical Independence
• Managerial Independence
• Financial Independence
What is IV&V?
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IV&V Technical Approaches:
• Aligned with IEEE 1012
• Captured in a Catalog of 
Methods
• Spans the full project lifecycle
IV&V Assurance Strategy
The IV&V Project’s strategy for providing mission assurance
Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project
Implemented via an Assurance Design
Communicated via Assurance Statements
5What is IV&V? (continued)
• The IV&V Assurance Strategy is the selection and implementation of 
IV&V validation and verification processes 
– Implementation of the IV&V processes are driven by the IV&V Project’s risk 
assessment and unique characteristics
– The Assurance Strategy is tailored to the needs of the individual projects
• The validation process provides empirical evidence that engineering 
products:
– Satisfy system requirements allocated to software 
– Solve the right problems
– Satisfy the intended use and user needs in expected operational environments
• The verification process provides empirical evidence that 
engineering products:
– Conform to requirements (for example: for correctness, completeness, 
consistency, accuracy) during all life cycle phases (requirements, design, code, 
test)
– Satisfy standards and best practices
– Establish a basis for assessing the completion of each life cycle phase, and 
initiating other life cycle phases
6• IV&V processes include assessments, analyses, evaluations, 
reviews, inspections, and testing of software artifacts during 
the entire development lifecycle that create evidence
– Evidence is used to formulate recommendations that improve the quality (or 
reliability) of the system software
– Evidence is used to make conclusions about the quality (or reliability) of the 
system software
– Evidence is used to gain insight into the technical progress
– Evidence is used to judge how thorough you’ve critiqued the system
• How much evidence  it is a trade-off between criticality of the 
system being acquired/deployed
– Life‐sustaining subsystems would warrant an evidence package that clearly & 
objectively shows the software will operate safely (or clearly shows that it 
won’t) 
– Data management subsystems may warrant less of an evidence package 
• The amount of evidence needed determines the rigor of the analysis
– Analytical Rigor is the type and amount of IV&V processes to use for analysis
What is IV&V? (continued)
7Establishing the IV&V 
Assurance Strategy
• The IV&V Program assesses the system to determine:
– The inherent risk associated with the system capabilities
– The role of software in those capabilities 
– Which software elements of the system warrant IV&V analysis
– Software elements are generally the focal point of IV&V analyses; however, 
other lifecycle artifacts (for example: concept documentation, system design, 
etc…) are utilized to inform lower‐level analyses
• Our process is called “Portfolio Based Risk Assessment” (PBRA)
– Results in scores for impact (a measure of the effect of a problem) and likelihood 
(the potential for the existence of errors) for each system capability and software 
element
– Enables informed decision making regarding:
• What parts of the system should IV&V work on
• What analytical rigor should IV&V apply (for example: dynamic 
analysis should be conducted to thoroughly test the implementation of 
the protocol used for communications)
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Establishing the IV&V 
Assurance Strategy (continued)
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Subsystem 1 – do not recommend IV&V
Subsystem 2 – recommend IV&V utilizing Static Analysis
Subsystem 3 – recommend IV&V utilizing Dynamic Analysis
Subsystem n … 
SMEs conduct formal 
or informal inspections &
evidence is recorded simply
as issues
SMEs apply formalisms
& mathematical rigor
to prove existence or
absence of critical
properties
Manual Analysis
Amount of Rigor & Evidence Needed
Formal AnalysisStatic Analysis Dynamic Analysis
SMEs evaluate structure
& content using various
perspectives supported 
by CASE tools.  Evidence is
recorded as issues & 
supplemented with coverage
SMEs execute system & 
evaluate results.  Evidence is
recorded more thoroughly as
to make the case for what
works and what are limitations
less more
1 2 3
Subsystem Criticality Profile
9Implementing the IV&V 
Assurance Strategy
• IV&V Assurance Strategy is implemented through the Assurance 
Design
• The Assurance Design specifics the Technical Reference, inputs, analysis 
techniques, and objective evidence necessary to achieve the IV&V Project’s 
Objectives
• Like the Assurance Strategy, the Assurance Design is specific to the needs of an 
individual project
• Constructed to allow the IV&V Project to generate evidence to assure the 
critical capabilities and mitigate system risk 
• Areas of risk identified in the PBRA are key inputs into the development of 
the Assurance Design
• Assurance Statements are utilized to communicate the results of 
the implementation of the IV&V Assurance Strategy
• A statement of the assurance that is being provided (or intended to be provided) 
by IV&V to a stakeholder or stakeholders on a system or subsystem
• Assurance statements are typically formulated at the beginning of a IV&V 
Project and refined as necessary throughout execution
Tools for Implementing the 
IV&V Assurance Strategy
• NASA’s IV&V Program strives to continually develop new 
capabilities to support the execution of the IV&V Assurance 
Strategy
– IV&V Techniques are documented in a Catalog of Methods (CoM) 
– Techniques are continually refined and tailored to the needs of the 
projects
• To maintain relevance, the IV&V Program selectively invests 
in new technologies necessary to assure NASA’s safety and 
mission critical software
– NASA’s IV&V Program is advancing the state of the practice in 
Cybersecurity / Information Assurance and Independent Testing
• Advanced techniques and capabilities are being developed to 
enable the program to keep pace with current development trends 
and emerging risk factors
• Information Assurance and Independent Testing are becoming an 
increasingly prominent component of IV&V Project’s Assurance 
Strategies  
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Cybersecurity / Information Assurance
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Threat and Risk Assessment
• FISMA Compliance
• Life-cycle
• Provide mission security assurance 
throughout design, development, 
implementation, operation, maintenance, 
and disposition 
• Assessment and Authorization (A&A)
• Authority to Operate (ATO)
IV&V In-Phase IA Support
• Build security in “from the ground up.”
• Security Architecture Verification 
• IV&V Methods
Vulnerability Assessment /
Penetration Testing
• Implementation of Security Controls
• Monitoring of Security Controls
• Static Code Analysis (SCA)
CyberLab
• Component of ITC JSTAR Lab
• Virtualized servers
• Penetration Test tools
• Cybersecurity Knowledge Base
• Cybersecurity Training Program
• Mission System Virtualization and Testing
Ensuring Mission and Safety Critical Software and Systems Operate Reliably, Safely, 
and Securely
Independent Testing
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Simulation
• Functional Software-only Simulators 
• NASA Operational Middleware (NOS)
o Common emulation software
o Middleware 
• Spacecraft Simulators 
o Ground systems, instruments, spacecraft 
dynamics
• Small Sat 
• Integrate many technologies to create solutions
Testing
• Provide evidence-based assurance to customer 
• Risk-focused independent testing
• Focused on testing adverse conditions 
o Fault injection, back-to-back scenarios, etc.
Automation
• Simulation Verification
• Increase Testing 
o Unit Testing 
o System Testing 
• Automated Installations and Simulator Deployments 
Virtualization 
• Heavy reliance on virtualization technologies 
o Development
o Simulator Releases
o Rapid Deployment 
o Evaluation Environments  
Develop, maintain, and operate adaptable test environments for NASA’s IV&V Program 
that enable the dynamic analysis of software behaviors for multiple NASA missions 
• Yields higher confidence that delivered products are error free and meet 
the user needs.
• Increases likelihood of uncovering high-risk errors early in the 
development lifecycle.
– Allows time for the design team to evolve a comprehensive solution rather than forcing 
them into a makeshift fix to accommodate deadlines
• Delivers ongoing status indicators and performance reporting to decision 
makers (e.g. program managers). 
– The customer is provided an incremental preview of system performance with the 
chance to make early adjustments.
• Reduces the need for rework from the developing contractor thereby 
reducing total costs to programs and projects.
• Facilitates the transfer of system and software engineering best practices.
IV&V leads to higher quality products, reduced risk, greater 
insight, reduced cost, and knowledge transfer.
Summary
Benefits of IV&V
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QUESTIONS?
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IV&V plays a key role in a number of high-profile NASA and non-
NASA missions.
IV&V Services
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Generic Look at IV&V 
Needs Analysis & 
Concept Phase
Requirements
Specification
Design
Implementation
Integration & 
Test
Ops & 
Maintenance
Requirements Analysis 
{ensure the requirements are high quality (correct, consistent, complete, accurate, unambiguous , and 
verifiable) and adequately meet the needs of the system and user}
Design Analysis 
{ensure the design is a correct, accurate, and complete transformation of the requirements that will meet the 
operational need under nominal and off-nominal conditions and that no unintended features are introduced}
Code Analysis 
{ensure the implementation is correct, accurate, and complete, relative to requirements, operational need 
under nominal and off-nominal conditions, and introduces no unintended features }
Test Analysis 
{ensure testing will serve as a sufficient means to verify and validate that the implementation meets the 
requirements and operational need under nominal and off-nominal conditions}
Concept Analysis 
{validate selected solution, validate s/w reuse strategy, verify sys. architecture is complete, ensure security 
threats & risks are known}
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Operational & Maintenance Analysis
{ensure operating procedures are correct and usable, new constraints & changes are understood and 
appropriately addressed, and ensure anomalies are understood and appropriately addressed}
